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Abstract 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) has shed powerful light on cultures where the influence of 
patronage, preferment, and reciprocal obligations are traditionally important. We argue here 
that episcopal appointments, culture, and governance within the Catholic Church are ideal 
topics for SNA interrogation. This paper presents prelminary findings, using original network 
data for the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales and the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops. These show how a network-informed approach may help 
with the urgent task of understanding the ecclesiastical cultures in which sexual abuse occurs, 
and/or is enabled, ignored, and covered up. Particular reference is made to Theodore 
McCarrick, the former DC Archbishop recently “dismissed from the clerical state”. 
Commentators naturally use terms like “protégé”, “clique”, “network”, and “kingmaker” 
when discussing both the McCarrick affair and church politics more generally: precisely such 
folk-descriptions of social and political life that SNA is designed to quantify and explain. 
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Introduction 
In recent decades, the collection of tools, theories, and methods commonly described 
as Social Network Analysis (hereafter “SNA”) has – paralleling similar developments in both 
natural and computer sciences – shed powerful light on diverse areas of social, cultural, 
political, intellectual, and religious life. These include the epidemiology of contagious 
diseases (Keeling and Eames, 2005), the formation and spread of rival philosophical schools 
in medieval Europe (Collins, 1998:451-522), and collaborations among twentieth-century 
British classical composers (McAndrew and Everett, 2015). Undergirding much of this 
empirical work is an avowedly relational understanding both of individual subjects, and of 
the various, overlapping social worlds which they collectively inhabit, create, maintain, 
and/or change. Accordingly, if – as argued by one of relational sociology’s leading 
proponents – “The most appropriate analytic unit for the scientific study of social life is the 
network of social relations and interactions between actors (both human and corporate)”, then 
SNA has established itself as one of the principal means by which “we can identify 
mechanisms within interaction, relations and networks which help to explain and understand 
events in the social world” (Crossley, 2011:1, 4). 
This paper has two main purposes. Firstly, we seek to show how certain methods and 
theoretical insights within SNA might illumine a subject of critical and – in light of events 
and revelations, both recent and long-ongoing – urgent significance within the sociology of 
religion. While appreciably slower to “catch on” in this field than in many others, there is 
now a reasonably substantial body of literature applying SNA within the sociological study of 
religion (Everton, 2018). To the best of our knowledge, none of it has focused on episcopal 
networks, whether Catholic or otherwise. In fact, there does not exist a huge amount of 
empirical social research on Catholic bishops, either as individuals or as collective actors – 
albeit with some notable exceptions. Closest in spirit to the approach adopted herein is 
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Melissa Wilde’s (2007) application of Social Movement Theory to episcopal politicking 
during the debates of Second Vatican Council. In addition, there has been a handful of 
psychological studies of US bishops based on mailed questionnaires (e.g., Sheehan and 
Kobler, 1977; Schroeder, 1978), though these are now forty years old. The American Jesuit 
priest and journalist Thomas Reese, who holds a PhD in Political Science, published detailed 
studies of several aspects of the Church’s internal “power structure” (e.g., 1989; 1992). Most 
recently, researchers at the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate in Washington, 
DC, have published a new monograph based on surveys and/or interviews with a majority of 
current “Ordinaries”1 (Fichter et al., 2019).  
Our second intention is to present initial findings from our own exploratory, “proof-
of-concept” application of formal SNA to Catholic episcopal networks. This encompasses i) a 
pilot study, using data from the (relatively small) Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England 
and Wales. We used this, primarily, to test out methodological decisions regarding the 
sampling, compiling, and coding of the dataset, and also to assist with hypothesis generation. 
And ii) various analyses, using network data for each member of the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, as of July 2018, which – as we argue – lend considerable 
support to the hypothesis, widely shared among commentators on the Catholic abuse crisis, 
that there is a critical network dimension both to the problem and, perhaps, to its solution. 
‘The key now is to uncover the networks within the clergy and episcopate’ (Dreher, 2018a). 
We conclude by suggested various possibile areas for future, deeper research. 
 
Background and rationale 
The motivation for this present study comes from three different sources. The first is 
the recognition that SNA has proven specially transformative in exploring networks in which 
the influence of patronage, preferment, and indebtedness are typically important. These could 
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include anything from the mafia in Italy or the USA (Varese, 2013; Mastrobuoni and 
Patacchini, 2012), Chinese political elites (Keller, 2016), the academic job market (Kawa et 
al., 2019), or appointments to corporate boards of directors (Koenig and Gogel, 1981). Prima 
facie, episcopal appointments, culture, and (therefore) governance within the Catholic Church 
are ideal topics for serious SNA attention (see also Pogorelc, forthcoming2). Note, for 
example, the following sui generis features (cf. Reese, 1984; O’Callaghan, 2007: 119-52; 
Allen, 2016a): 
i) The special nature of the bishop-clergy relationship (e.g., “Clerics are bound 
by a special obligation to show reverence and obedience to […] their own 
ordinary”; Code of Canon Law, 273), which in purely practical terms extends 
far beyond ordinary employer-employee dynamic within the secular world 
(outside of certain forms of bonded or indentured labour); 
ii) the crucial role that the Ordinary plays in identifying, encouraging, and 
mentoring (including appointments to certain senior roles), potential future 
bishops; 
iii) the critical role that a priest’s own Ordinary plays in championing the 
‘candidacy’ of a specific priest to be considered for episcopal office;  
iv) the role that certain other, influential bishops have in supporting or 
undermining a particular candidate (especially the local Metropolitan, certain 
prelates known to “have the Nuncio’s – or Pope’s – ear”, the previous 
Ordinaries of a given See, and/or members of certain national or Vatican 
committees (cf. Code of Canon Law, 377); 
v) the fact that, aside from an “intense eight-day training program” held annually 
in Rome for newly appointed bishops, the primary way in which “bishopcraft” 
is learned is through informal apprenticeship under one’s own previous 
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bishop(s), especially through particular official roles within the diocesan 
administration, or – more formally – as an Ordinary’s auxiliary bishop. 
Whatever the theological justifications for, and desirability of, these features, from the 
perspective of SNA one might plausibly hypothesize a number of potentially negative 
properties emerging from this situation. For example, these might include the potential for 
ambitious clergy (or seminarians) to actively seek the favour and patronage of their own 
(and/or other influential) bishops, or indeed for bishops to use the hope – or even promise – 
of preferment as a means of incentivizing or rewarding loyalty. It could result in certain 
“types” (in terms of personality, class, ethnic background, theological vision, etc.) of priests 
being favoured and/or formed, in line with the type of their own bishop, and perhaps of a 
wider episcopal “mould” or “culture”. This homophilizing tendency would then be intensified 
by the fact that “how to be a bishop” is learned, in very great measure, through a process of 
imitation and socialization. It might lead to the creation of identifiable “factions” or “cliques” 
of bishops, bound by mutual bonds of preferment and favour, who act – formally or 
informally – in concert, and who each support and promote each other’s protégés. 
Furthermore, given all this, it might feasibly create shared senses of solidarity among 
particular groups of bishops, such that if “one falls, we all do”. To give a hypothetical 
example: suppose that the bishops in a given province had all served as vicars general, 
chancellors, and/or auxiliary bishops for each other, and had in turn (even absent direct or 
formal collusion; cf. Bourdieu, [1984] 1988:84-9 on similar dynamics at work within 
academic appointments) returned the favour by supporting the promotion of each other’s 
chancery favourites. Should one of the senior bishops in this group then be rumoured to have 
committed crimes while in office, it is not hard to imagine how others in the network might 
seek a “quiet” solution to the problem, to prevent either themselves or their patrons becoming 
implicated, even if by association, to varying degrees. 
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Secondly, this a priori fittedness of an SNA-informed approach to understanding 
episcopal governance structures receives considerable a posteriori support of various kinds. 
As noted above, Wilde (2007) demonstrates the value in adapting methods and perspectives 
commonly used to study political movements in order to shed light on the often-shadowy 
world of church politics. Furthermore, in reporting on and analysing such topics, well-
informed journalists and academics naturally speak in terms of “networks”, “factions”, 
“cliques”, “lobbies”, “protégés”, and “patrons” – that is to say, precisely the kind of folk-
descriptions of social and political life which SNA seeks to quantify and interrogate. To give 
a single illustration here, note these excerpts from veteran Rome correspondent Robert 
Mickens, writing for the National Catholic Reporter: 
The current system the church uses to seek out and appoint candidates for episcopal 
service is far too often based on cronyism inherent in an old boys’ network […] The 
apostolic nuncio plays a major role in drawing up the terna of (the top three) 
candidates for a particular episcopal post. [… The] roughly 30 cardinals and other 
ranking prelates from around the world who are members of the Congregation for 
Bishops […] discuss and vote on the candidates. […] However, well before this 
happens, bishops, in too many cases, have already begun “grooming” someone – 
perhaps a star seminarian or their priest-secretary – to be a future member of their 
very exclusive club, the episcopal college. […] Customarily, the ordinary of [a] large 
diocese has a fairly good chance of pinpointing the man or men he wants as an 
auxiliary bishop. And if he’s well connected in Rome, especially with members of the 
pertinent congregation, this major hierarch can often help advance an auxiliary (or 
another bishop friend) to head his own diocese. (2016)  
Finally, and more specifically, existing analysis of the scandals engulfing the Catholic 
Church in the United States (as in several other countries) highlights the role that precisely 
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these kinds of network dynamics may have contributed, directly and indirectly, to both 
individual and institutional failures (and/or crimes) in adequately dealing with accusations of 
sexual abuse. Recognition of the need to focus on organizational cultures and contexts in 
both diagnosing and treating the “sexual abuse crisis” in toto is not wholly novel (Keenan, 
2011). Yet it was thrust to the fore in 2018 primarily, though by no means exclusively, by the 
revelations surrounding Theodore McCarrick, formerly Cardinal-Archbishop of Washington, 
DC. While the full details, including allegations of grooming and sexual abuse of both boys 
and young men,3 are beyond the scope of this paper, and have besides received very wide 
media coverage (see, in detail, Altieri 2020), a number of network-relevant aspects are worth 
highlighting. 
 
The McCarrick Case: A Relational Perspective  
First, McCarrick’s predilection for identifying select groups of “especially favored” 
(Goodstein and Otterman, 2018) seminarians and young priests – i.e., “young men under his 
authority in the Church” (Dreher, 2018b) – whom he showered lavishly with alcohol, flattery, 
handwritten notes, gifts, meals, overnight stays at his personal beach house, and prophecies 
of great futures in the Church. These he referred to as his “nephews” and encouraged them to 
call him “Uncle Ted”. 
Second, the unwillingness of subordinates within his diocese(s) to refuse dubious 
requests, or to speak out in other ways. Note here the testimony of Fr Boniface Ramsey, who 
was a faculty member at Newark’s archdiocesan seminary during McCarrick’s 1986-2000 
tenure as Archbishop, and whose repeated, unheeded attempts at whistleblowing have now 
come to light. Regarding McCarrick’s widely-known practice of sharing a bed with his 
seminarians – he would deliberately invite more “nephews” to his Jersey Shore beach house 
than there were beds to accommodate – Ramsey rhetorically asks: “what member of the 
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faculty would approach the archbishop to tell him that it just wasn’t right?” Commenting on a 
“sense of resignation” among the seminary faculty, Ramsey recalls his own first attempt at 
raising the issue with his immediate superior: “The rector knew exactly what I was talking 
about and promised to do what he could to stop it, after admitting that he felt strung between 
his loyalty to his archbishop and his realization that what the archbishop was doing wasn’t 
right” (2019; emphasis added). 
Third, McCarrick’s acknowledged status as the “the kingmaker for appointments in 
the Curia and the United States” (Viganó, 2018: 8) among American bishops. This claim has 
featured prominently in reports following the 2018 revelations, along with questions 
concerning the extent to which other high-placed US bishops and/or cardinals in his 
“network” might have benefited from his championing (e.g., Dougherty, 2018; Dreher, 
2018c). Nor is this mere post-facto speculation. Well prior to the scandals erupting in June 
2018, McCarrick’s outsized pull on episcopal placings – over and above the Cardinal-
Archbishop of Washington’s traditional clout – was generally acknowledged. His direct role 
as the “architect” of specific appointments was also regularly reported in the media (Palmo, 
2016; Allen, 2016b). Importantly, however, this kind of influence is not something unique to 
McCarrick: the existence of powerful “bishopmakers” follows naturally from the episcopal 
selection process as described above. Certain bishops have reputations for exerting various 
types of sway, whether official or unofficial, to have their own favorites and protégés 
elevated to the episcopacy. 
Fourth, the fact that serious allegations about McCarrick were widely known, and 
even more widely rumoured, among the highest echelons of the hierarchy for decades, but 
were dismissed, ignored, or – in at least two cases – paid-off by his previous dioceses with 
five- or six-figure settlements. This retrospective “everybody knew” aspect is, of course, a 
common theme in the exposure of high-profile serial sex offenders (e.g., Jimmy Savile). A 
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small number of (relatively junior) USCCB members have gone so far as to accuse their 
fellow bishops of, at best, negligence and, at worst, complicity and conspiracy. Thus Robert 
Barron, an auxiliary bishop in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, writes:  
[I]t seems numerous bishops, archbishops, and cardinals, both in this country and in 
the Vatican, knew all about McCarrick’s outrageous behavior and did nothing in 
response to it; or, rather worse, they continued to advance him up the ecclesiastical 
ladder, from auxiliary bishop, to bishop of a diocese, to archbishop, and finally to 
cardinal. Even after he resigned from his post in Washington, DC, […] McCarrick 
continued to be a roving ambassador for the Church and a kingmaker in the American 
hierarchy – again, while everyone knew about his disturbing and abusive tendencies. 
(2019: loc. 104; see also Lopes, 2018) 
Understandably, questions have been raised as to what specific bishops close to him, 
including members of a so-called “McCarrick caucus” (Allen, 2016b) whose church careers 
he appears to have helped, knew and when, and what they did (not) do and why (not). 
Cardinal Donald Wuerl, who became Archbishop of Washington in 2006, resigned in 
October 2018, in part due to pressure from reports that he had known of accusations against 
his predecessor for over a decade without acting. Wuerl initially denied these reports before, 
after irrefutable evidence was produced, apologizing for having “forgotten” he had known 
(Guidos, 2019).  
Fifth, the Catholic Church’s male-only priesthood means that, while Catholic sexual 
abuse is not exclusively homosexual in nature, sexual activity (whether abusive or not) 
among bishops, priests, and seminarians ipso facto is. Furthermore, while celibacy is 
demanded of all Latin-rite priests4 and seminarians, straight and gay, simply being same-sex 
attracted is, in and of itself, officially problematic (see Congregation for Catholic Education, 
2005). From a network-perspective, this combination of factors has important relevance for 
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understanding the McCarrick case. Not least, there is clear potential for mutually 
compromised networks of homosexually active (or once-active) priests, such as McCarrick 
appears to have cultivated among his “nephews”. (By contrast, illicitly heterosexually active 
bishops and priests – there are no shortage of examples – can only be so with those outside of 
the priestly networks.) The existence of “homosexual subcultures” within US Catholic 
seminaries or diocesan power structures, while understandably a sensitive topic, is well-
established in the academic literature, as too are the disproportionately high numbers of same 
sex-attracted seminarians and clergy in the first place (Greeley, 2004: 42-6; Cozzens, 2004: 
124-39). In itself, that same-sex attracted seminarians and priests might form friendship and 
support groups with those who can empathize with their trials is wholly unsurprising. But, 
combined with an intensely homosocial environment, a culture of secrecy and shame 
combined with legitimate fear for one’s vocation or ministry should one be “outed” (Martin, 
2018), and a special bishop-priest/seminarian relationship which, irrespective of its other 
virtues and/or theological rationale, is certainly open to exploitation, then the risk of other 
McCarrick-esque cases is certainly a real one. 
And sixth, details from subsequent episcopal scandals have shed further light on the 
wider culture in which McCarrick thrived for so long. Most intriguing here is the case of 
Bishop Michael Bransfield, who retired from the Diocese of Wheeling-Charleston, West 
Virginia, in late 2018. He too stands accused of sexually harassing and assaulting seminarians 
and young priests under his authority. Investigators also uncovered hundreds of cash “gifts” 
made from his personal account before being routinely reimbursed from diocesan funds, 
amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars (Boorstein et al., 2019). Personal payments of 
four- or five-figure sums were regularly made to other bishops, especially those in influential 
positions in America and Rome – a practice which, as it transpires, is perfectly common. As 
one veteran Vaticanista puts it: “the impression one gets from bishops’ public statements is 
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that very few of them thought anything was strange about the money going around. It’s just 
what high churchmen do, at least in the US” (Altieri, 2019). Other journalists have pointed 
out that McCarrick, too, was known for his largesse, and indeed he and Bransfield worked 
closely together on the Board of a major US-based Church fundraising charity, the Papal 
Foundation (O’Brien, 2018; Flynn, 2019). Several bishops and cardinals who received 
Bransfield’s checks have since made clear that these gifts came with no strings or conditions 
attached, and thus were in no sense “bribes”. Maybe so. But as generations of social scientists 
are all too aware, cultures in which reciprocal gift-giving is an embedded practice invariably 
tend to produce complex (and networked) relationships of trust, indebtedness, solidarity, 
obligation, and counter-obligation, even if the actors are not themselves fully conscious of 
them. That said, one presumes that McCarrick himself, having earned a PhD in Sociology 
from the Catholic University of America in 1963, might not be wholly unacquainted with the 
classic theories of Malinowski and Mauss. 
 
Social Network Analysis: An Introduction 
 Since the precise techniques and jargon of SNA are not typically familiar to 
sociologists and other scholars of religion (Everton, 2018: loc. 549 n. 6), we feel it may be 
helpful here to provide a brief primer before proceeding.  
A social network is defined as a collection of a finite set of actors (nodes) and the 
relation/ties between them (Robins, 2015). Actors (nodes) are defined as discrete individuals 
or groups and usually they have characteristics or attributes. The terms actors and nodes will 
be used interchangeably in this paper. As for ties, it seems that there is no formal definition in 
the literature except that they establish a linkage between a pair of actors (Borgatti et al., 
2013). 
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 Social Selection and Social Influence Processes. The two basic processes that 
underlie the formation of a social network are social selection and social influence (Robins et 
al., 2001). A social selection process is defined as a process in which actors structure their 
networks on the basis of member attributes. For instance, a bishop developed an alliance with 
other bishops due to personal characteristic(s) shared such as a common theological view. 
Social selection predicts that individuals select a certain position in the social network due to 
their personal characteristics, hence forming a relationship with other individuals that allow 
them to occupy that particular position. Conversely, social influence is a process in which 
actors gain/change certain attributes due to the network structure. Social influence may arise 
when individuals change others’ behaviour or characteristic, or individuals imitate the 
behaviour or characteristic of others. An example of this would be if a bishop changes his 
theological view to conform to his colleagues. These two processes are usually intertwined; 
however, the focus of this study is only on social selection processes. 
 Network Centrality. Social selection processes would determine the nodes position 
in the network. Nodes in a central position tend to be regarded as having more prestige, 
influence, power, autonomy, and so on. Studies found that people in a central position tend to 
reap certain benefits such as having better grades (Bruun and Brewe, 2013), higher personal 
accomplishment (Shapiro et al., 2015), better organisational citizenship behaviour that leads 
to better well-being (Tsang et al., 2012), and so on. People in the central positions of the 
network might also determine the life and death of the network. In criminal networks, for 
example, it is sufficient to take out the key players to pacify the whole entire network 
(Sparrow, 1991). 
 There are several measures of centrality. In this paper, we would like to focus on 
degree centrality. Degree centrality refers to the number of edges (or ties) that a node (or 
vertex) has (Robins, 2015). The higher the number of edges/ties, the higher the degree 
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centrality of the node/vertex. Nodes with high degree centrality would be highly visible and 
be considered as important in the network. Most of the information that runs through the 
network would pass by these nodes, giving them a clearer picture of what is happening in the 
network. Decision makers, leaders, social influencers tend to be in such positions. Based on 
this premise, bishops/cardinals that have a high degree of centrality in a network would have 
more power or influence to control the network and they will have more knowledge about the 
network. The high number of people that they have direct contact with would mean that they 
have the potential to diffuse information to the network quickly. 
In a directed network, degree centrality is divided into indegree and outdegree. 
Indegree is the number of ties that a node received, while outdegree is the number of ties that 
a node sent. The interpretation for indegree and outdegree is quite different. In a network 
diagram of which bishops have served under whom, a high indegree would mean that a 
bishop had a lot of others serving under him, while high outdegree would mean that this 
bishop had served under many bishops. Our focus is directed into indegree centrality as we 
theorize that when a certain bishop has high indegree, he would have more power over the 
network as he has more people in the network that was “moulded” by him. There are still 
many other measures of centrality such as betweenness, beta centrality/bonacich, closeness, 
and k-reach centrality, but those are beyond the scope of this paper. 
  
Pilot study: England and Wales 
 Before creating the USCCB dataset, we felt it important to do a test run based upon a 
much smaller dataset. This would allow a number of basic methodological choices regarding 
the scope (people, timeframe) and coding (what types of “tie”, and how differentiated) of the 
underlying adjacency matrix to be honed effectively: repeat “do-overs” are not so easy with a 
manually compiled 422 x 422 matrix, as our US dataset turned out to be. The Catholic 
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Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales was selected for this sandboxing stage, due both 
to its size (with 27 dioceses and equivalents,5 compared to the US’s 197), and to one of us 
being familiar with its personnel and reported dynamics. 
 Naturally, there are many ways in which bishops might be socially “tied” to each 
other: e.g., attending the same seminary or university, being involved with certain 
apostolates, or simply through getting to know each other at various (formal or informal) get-
togethers. This is particularly true of the English and Welsh Church, which is a small world 
both geographically and otherwise. For reasons outlined above, however, i) the special, sui 
generis relationship between an Ordinary and his literal subordinates, and ii) the significant 
influence of an individual’s current and former Ordinaries over whether he becomes a bishop 
himself, and if so, over his subsequent episcopal “career”, appear to be of overriding 
importance. This Ordinary-subordinate “tie” is not a uniform one: it is reasonable to 
hypothesize differing “strengths” to the relationship based on different roles that a given 
priest/bishop has served in under a given bishop. 
 Given these assumptions, the basic sample was restricted to all living bishops who 
either are, or have been (i.e., emeriti, many of whom remain active in pastoral and 
administrative work), members of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales. 
This excluded any papal diplomats from England and Wales who have been ordained as 
(arch)bishops, but who are not and never have been CBCEW members. It included, however, 
one bishop (Roche) now assigned to a fulltime role in the Roman Curia, but who was 
previously the Bishop of Leeds. Data was originally collected in mid-October 2018, then 
slightly updated in October 2019 for publication in order to reflect a number of new 
retirements and appointments in the intervening year. Ties were defined according to which 
bishops the members of this original sample had served under (including any now deceased, 
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though these are not included in the below network map), coded for three different “weights” 
of seniority/trustedness of role: 
1) whether A has served directly under Ordinary B in some capacity (i.e., as a priest 
of B’s diocese, or – in the case of Bishopric of the Forces – as a priest on loan to 
the Ordinary);  
2) whether A has served in one of a small set of especially high-trust diocesan 
positions (Vicar General, Episcopal Vicar, Chancellor, seminary Rector, Private 
Secretary within diocese) under B, or as General Secretary of the Bishops’ 
Conference under B as Cardinal-President.  
3) whether A has served as an Auxiliary or Coadjutor Bishop under B.6 
Where A has served B at one or more different levels – e.g., a stint as an Episcopal Vicar (2), 
following on from many years as a regular parish priest (1) – the tie was recorded in 
accordance with the highest level (so 2). Given the precedence accorded to the Ordinary-
subordinate relationship, cases where, e.g., C was a religious priest serving in a parish in B’s 
diocese, but not under B’s canonical authority (that is, C’s Superior remained his own Abbot 
or Provincial), were not counted as a tie (though serving under B at levels 2 or 3 would be). 
These data were collected and inputted manually into Excel, creating a 80 x 80 adjacency 
matrix (including those deceased). One virtue of this coding methodology is that, in principle, 
these ties and their weights are based upon objective, publicly available data: whether or not 
B has served under A, and when and in what formal capacities, are facts of the kind that 
would feature in any “ecclesiastical CV”. A variety of web-based sources were used, 
including biographies given on official CBCEW and diocesan websites, individual bishops’ 
Wikipedia pages, and (for dates of ordination and episcopal appointments) 
http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/.  
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 Figure 1 shows the resulting network map of all living CBCEW members, active and 
retired (names in parentheses), constructed using the NodeXL software package (Smith et al. 
2010). The graph was drawn using the Harel-Koren Fast Multiscale algorithm (Harel and 
Koren 2002), then lightly amended for ease of presentation. Edges are directed, with “A  
B” signifying “A served under B”, and are assigned a tone/width corresponding to the three 
weights outlined above (with 1 being the lightest/thinnest, and 3 the darkest/heaviest). Nodes 
are sized according to their indegree (i.e., the total number of other bishops/nodes, 
irrespective of edge weights, who have served under them). Of 58 nodes, 40 form part of a 
single constellation, connected by 49 edges; a further seven are one of three much smaller 
constellation, of one or two edges each; 11 are isolates. The main constellation has a diameter 
of 9, with a mean distance between nodes of 3.8. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Network map of living members of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England 
and Wales, both active and retired (October 2019) 
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 The purpose of this pilot study was simply to test out various sampling and coding 
strategies, and to see whether the application of SNA to a Bishops’ Conference could produce 
a meaningful network map. This it certainly appears to have done. The influence of certain 
Metropolitan Archbishops, due both to their special role in the nomination process, and their 
typically having several auxiliary bishops under them, is clear: all 7 nodes with an indegree 
of 3 or more are, or were, Archbishops of Westminster (Nichols), Birmingham (Nichols, 
Longley), Southwark (Bowen, McDonald, Smith), Liverpool (Kelly, M. McMahon), and/or 
Cardiff (Smith). Furthermore, the graph clearly shows the overwhelming influence and 
centrality of Cardinal Nichols, with a quarter of all bishops (15 out of 58), and a third of all 
non-retired bishops (11 out of 34), having served under him, in most cases as auxiliaries. 
Nichols’ centrality is, moreover, probably greater than that of his recent predecessors, having 
led another large archdiocese for nine years prior to his translation to Westminster (which 
neither Hume, 1976-99, nor Murphy-O’Connor, 2000-9, had).  
The fact that the graph conforms, in these and other basic respects, to what any 
observer of English and Welsh Catholicism “could have told you anyway” is a good sign: a 
network map seeming to show, say, Nichols as a marginal figure within the CBCEW, or one 
of the long-retired auxiliaries as its kingpin, would be (correctly) suspected of having fatal 
methodological flaws. That said, the above graph does not simply represent a wildly 
convoluted and laborious method of arriving at obvious facts. It also, arguably, sheds light on 
the more subtle dynamics of CBCEW politics. Two examples may be given here. Firstly, it 
was reported that, prior to the 2016 EU referendum, a Nichols-backed attempt to put out an 
official CBCEW statement in favour of Remain (i.e., anti-Brexit) was thwarted by a minority 
of bishops (Thompson 2016). If one knew nothing more about the Bishops’ Conference than 
the information presented in Figure 1, then a betting person might reasonably suppose this 
rebellion to have been fomented within the relatively dense “Southwark cluster” towards the 
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left of the graph, most of whose members are at two removes from Nichols’ direct circle. 
This was in fact the case, with Peter Smith, then Southwark’s Archbishop, reportedly leading 
the charge. Secondly, there are two bishops whose occasional public statements have been 
widely perceived as being out of step with the CBCEW consensus on certain “hot button” 
issues (e.g., on the reception of communion by the divorced-and-remarried, or by politicians 
supporting abortion or same-sex marriage). Devotees of SNA will not be surprised to learn 
that these two, Egan and Davies, are a) themselves closely tied, with both having served 
under Noble, and Egan having been Davies’ Vicar General; and b) out on a limb, in both 
senses, in terms of the wider CBCEW network (Egan, at 6 removes, is the joint-furthest 
vertex from Nichols in the main constellation). 
 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops  
Methodology 
 In essentials, data collection and input followed the procedure laid down in the pilot 
study, with the exception that deceased bishops were automatically excluded from the 
sample. In total, there were 424 bishops in the US as of July 2018 (i.e., when the McCarrick 
scandal broke). We also collected data on whether they are cardinals, archbishops, bishops, 
auxiliary bishops, and whether they have retired or not. 
 As the first step in analysing the data, we undertook several visualisations of the 
network. We used two types of community detection algorithms, K-Core and VOS, using the 
software package Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 2011). K-Core creates subnetworks of a given 
network where each node has at least k neighbours in the same core. We experimented with 
different values of k to find an optimal result and ended up with k = 3. VOS is a community 
detection algorithm that determines the clustering (C) of a network by maximizing its 
modularity. Below is the formula: 
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Q(C) =∑(
1(𝐶)
𝑚
𝐶∈𝐶
− (
𝑑(𝐶)
2𝑚
)2) 
1(C) is the number of ties between nodes belonging to cluster C, and d(C) is the sum of the 
degrees of nodes from C. 
The second step of the analysis was calculating the degree centrality of each 
individual bishop. Since it is a directed network, we calculated indegree. This calculation was 
done using UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2013). We then listed 10 bishops with the highest 
indegree (that is, the highest number of other bishops in the networks who have served under 
them). 
Results 
Out of 424 bishops, there were 256 active bishops and 168 emeritus bishops. The 
mean age of the bishops is 71.12 years (SD = 11.69), with a mean time they were ordained as 
bishops of 17.61 years (SD = 13.01) The complete breakdown of the rank is provided in 
Table 1. 
 
Rank Number Percentage 
Cardinal-Archbishop 6 1.4% 
Cardinal-Archbishop Emeritus 9 2.1% 
Archbishop 28 6.6% 
Archbishop Emeritus 19 4.5% 
Bishop  143 33.7% 
Bishop Emeritus 92 21.7% 
Auxiliary Bishop 78 18.4% 
Auxiliary Bishop Emeritus 48 11.3% 
Coadjutor Bishop 1  0.2% 
Table 1. Ranks of bishop within USCCB sample, active and retired (July 2018) 
 
The next step of the analysis is creating visualisations of the network. These 
visualisations were produced using Pajek software. The first visualisation was produced using 
K-Core (fig. 2) and the second was using VOS (fig. 3). In both cases, active bishops are 
indicated by round nodes, and retired bishops by square ones, with all nodes sized according 
to their indegree (weighted, according to edge weight). Edges are colour-coded, according to 
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the three strengths of Ordinary-subordinate relationships outlined above: with black for “1” 
(normal priest), blue for “2” (higher-trust/senior priestly roles), and red for “3” (auxiliary or 
coadjutor bishop).  
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Fig. 2. Visualisation of US bishops’ network using K-Core (k = 3) (July 2018)  
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Fig. 3. Visualisation of US bishops’ network using VOS algorithm (July 2018) 
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 As is clear from the visualisations, there were some very large nodes (i.e., bishops 
who had high indegree). However, relying on sight alone, it would be difficult to determine 
accurately which bishops were in the center of the network (the key players). To obtain the 
information, we calculate the indegree of the bishops. The bishops have an average of 1.25 
(SD = 2.84) indegree. The top 10 bishops with the highest indegree are presented in Table 2. 
Name Rank (Last) Diocese Indegree 
Rigali Cardinal-Archbishop Emeritus Philadelphia 22 
McCarrick Cardinal-Archbishop Emeritus Washington 17 
Maida Cardinal-Archbishop Emeritus Detroit 17 
O'Malley Cardinal-Archbishop Boston 15 
Gómez Archbishop Los Angeles 14 
Wuerl Cardinal-Archbishop Washington 14 
Dolan Cardinal-Archbishop New York 13 
Chaput Archbishop Philadelphia 12 
Mahony Cardinal-Archbishop Emeritus Los Angeles 12 
Cupich Cardinal-Archbishop Chicago 11 
Table 2. US bishops with highest (weighted) indegree (July 2018) 
 
 Given the nature of episcopal appointments, it is no surprise that nodes with highest 
indegree are (or have been) Ordinaries of large dioceses, which typically have a significant 
number of auxiliaries, and in many cases have been Ordinaries for a long period: the top three 
are all emeriti of one or – in the cases of McCarrick (Newark and DC) and Rigali (St Louis 
and Philadelphia) – two major Archdioceses. Note too the presence of three voting members 
of the Vatican’s Congregation for Bishops, past (Rigali) and present (Cupich and – 
resignation from DC notwithstanding – Wuerl). Rigali’s pre-eminence is also noteworthy, 
given his decades-long career within the Roman curia prior to his appointment as Archbishop 
of St Louis in 1994, including five years as second-in-command of the Congregation for 
Bishops.7  
Finally, we extracted an ego-network for McCarrick, based on two degrees of 
separation (in either direction). Figure 4 presents a visualisation of this network, created with 
UCINET. So defined, McCarrick’s “personal community” (Chua et al, 2011) includes a total 
of 43 bishops, including several who are significant nodes in their own right (e.g., Farrell, 
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DiMarzio, Wuerl, Holley, Myers, J. Tobin). Note also the existence of certain alter-alter ties, 
that is, direct ties between non-McCarrick nodes. 
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Fig. 4. Ego-network for McCarrick, showing two degrees of separation (July 2018) 
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Discussion 
 These exploratory studies offer an original contribution to several live issues 
regarding episcopal structures and governance. At the most basic level, our network maps 
support the view that it is meaningful to talk in terms of there being defined “cliques” of 
bishops. While previous discussions of this phenomenon have tended to be limited to 
considering the direct relationships between a single bishop and his various “proteges” (e.g., 
Dreher, 2018a), our network visualizations reveal more complex kinds of clustering. That is 
to say, whether bishops B, C, and D have both served under A is not the only factor to take 
into account. Important too is whether B, C, or D have served under each other, or under a 
bishop Z of whom bishop A was himself once a protégé (and so on). As is clear from fig. 3, 
the US bishops do indeed tend to cluster into various more-or-less dense “flocks”.  
It is important to state that network proximity to a McCarrick (or whomever) is not 
itself any indication of another bishop’s knowledge of, complicity in, or imitation of a 
McCarrick’s misdeeds. And indeed, we know from other cases that sexual offenders are often 
adept at hiding their crimes, including from those closest to them. Nevertheless, given the 
nature of both the clerical Ordinary-subordinate relationship, the outsized influence that a 
priest’s own (former) Ordinary/ies has/have in advancing his own ecclesiastical career, and 
the great extent to which “bishopcraft” is passed on through a form of apprenticeship, then it 
would be naive in the extreme to ignore this “network dimension” entirely. We wish to 
highlight two significant issues where we think this kind of network-thinking might make a 
direct, positive contribution.  
The first relates to several inquiries into “historical”8 sexual abuse and its handling by 
church authorities, not least those commissioned by multiple states’ Attorneys General. 
Apparently without exception, these reveal a “standard response to reports of abuse by church 
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leadership” (Missouri Attorney General, 2019: 2) practised with remarkable consistency 
across different dioceses. As one scholar has recently summarized it: 
A more-or-less standard pattern emerged: credible allegations against an abusive 
priest being kept quiet, with assurances made to the victims and their families; the 
priest in question being quietly reassigned, perhaps after a period of ‘successful’ 
counselling at one of a small group of Church-run treatment centres specializing in 
precisely this, or sent to another diocese with a glowing letter of recommendation; no 
thought whatsoever being given to this new set of young people being put into very 
serious harm’s way; and this process being repeated, multiple times, for years if not 
decades. (Bullivant, 2019: 225)  
As the Grand Jury tasked with investigating six dioceses in Pennsylvania arrestingly puts it: 
“Special agents testified before us that they had identified a series of practices that regularly 
appeared, in various configurations, in the diocesan files they had analysed. It’s like a 
playbook for concealing the truth” (Pennsylvania Attorney General, 2018: 3; emphasis 
added). 
 This begs the question of precisely how this unwritten, secret “playbook” came both 
to be and to spread. There is no evidence of any explicit conspiracy between Catholic 
dioceses to create a set of norms or procedures to be followed in such circumstances, and yet 
it also seems a stretch simply to suppose that almost exactly the same “solutions” arose 
complete independently, by spontaneous generation, in each chancery. Much more plausible, 
we contend, is to view this metaphorical “playbook” as a set of routinized practices and 
norms, or habitus (see Bourdieu, [1972] 2013; Archer, 2010), emerging and diffusing 
“organically” within and through ecclesial networks. SNA studies have explored the ways in 
which the creation and spread of social norms, of various kinds, are affected by differences in 
network structure (e.g., Sen and Sen, 2009). Feasibly, the combination of i) socially learned 
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“bishopcraft”, with senior chancery roles serving as a quasi-apprenticeship for future bishops; 
ii) the existence of both strong, densely clustered groups of bishops in particular regions; and 
iii) weaker, though still significant, links between these local groups, due to rarer cross-
country promotions of bishops (cf. Granovetter, 1973); provides the ideal conditions for this 
unwritten “playbook” to become informally codified. Also amenable to serious SNA 
explanation, at least in principle, is the “underground railroad” shunting problem priests 
between dioceses: a rigorous mapping of which bishops loaned abusive priests to which other 
bishops could be a fascinating study in its own right.  
The second issue we wish to highlight is the scope for very serious conflicts of 
interest, especially among bishops with close ties to each other. The way episcopal 
appointments currently happen, it is frequently the case that bishops in a certain region are 
relatively densely clustered. This follows from several features (not bugs) of the system, not 
least the tradition of auxiliary bishops being created locally (with the Ordinary having a fairly 
free hand in nominating candidates),9 and the role that a province’s Ordinaries have in 
recommending candidates to nearby vacant sees. Undoubtedly, this system brings many 
benefits: for example, it is far more efficient than an unwieldy national system, and increases 
the chances of bishops actually knowing the people they are putting forward. One of several 
side-effects, however, is that if complaints are made against the former bishop of a diocese, 
then there is a strong likelihood of the current bishop being quite closely networked with 
him: even if neither has previously served under the other, the odds are good that they have 
mutual ties with other bishops who have. And indeed, this is precisely what happened with 
McCarrick. When the (arch)dioceses of Metuchen, Trenton, and Newark all made large cash 
settlements to McCarrick accusers in the mid-2000s, Metuchen’s Bootkoski and Trenton’s 
Smith (now deceased) had both been appointed by McCarrick as his auxiliaries. Meanwhile, 
Newark’s Myers, while not directly tied to McCarrick, is tied to eight other bishops who 
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served under McCarrick, including Bootkoski (see fig. 4). Likewise Wuerl, whose inaction 
when Archbishop of Washington was noted earlier, though also with no direct tie to 
McCarrick in fig. 4, nonetheless shares six former subordinates with him. Since new 
Ordinaries obviously “inherit” the auxiliaries and other clergy of their predecessors, these 
kinds of overlapping connections are impossible to avoid fully. It is not hard to think up 
scenarios in which bishops X and Y “sharing” subordinates , C, and D, even in the absence of 
a direct tie between X and Y, might create conflicted loyalties between the two. After all, if Y 
is found to have been engaged in serious wrongdoing, then questions will naturally be asked 
as to what knowledge or involvement B, C, or D might have had. Since B, C, and D may now 
be X’s own closest collaborators, friends, and protégés, the temptations of a quiet, out of 
court, and/or (to use a favoured euphemism) “pastoral” solution to the problem may be 
irresistible. More invidious still, consider that B, C, and D may now have intimate knowledge 
of any “dirt” on X, which, if X goes public with accusations against Y, might itself be leaked. 
  This recognition has significant implications regarding new canonical norms issued 
by Pope Francis in 2019, specifically to address the question of how serious complaints 
against bishops are properly to be dealt with and investigated. One noteworthy feature is that 
primary jurisdiction is granted to a province’s Metropolitan Archbishop to investigate 
allegations against bishops, past or present, in that province. (If the Metropolitan is himself 
the subject of the allegations, then this role would normally devolve to the “most senior 
suffragan Bishop by promotion, to whom, if such is the case, the following provisions 
regarding the Metropolitan apply”; Vos Estis, art. 8 §2). These canonical norms owe much of 
their genesis to the US crisis. Indeed, the fundamentals of this so-called “Metropolitan 
model” were widely reported to have been drafted by Wuerl and Cupich in the run-up to the 
USCCB’s own plenary meeting held in November 2018, something they themselves denied 
(White 2018).  
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 The new norms are, explicitly, alive to the potential for conflicts of interest:  
The Metropolitan is required to act impartially and free of conflicts of interest. If he 
considers himself to be in a conflict of interest or is unable to maintain the necessary 
impartiality to guarantee the integrity of the investigation, he is obliged to recuse 
himself and report the circumstance to the competent Dicastery. (Vos Estis, art. 12 §6; 
see also 13 §3) 
The practical difficulty, however, is this: given the structure of episcopal networks, there 
would seem to be a very low probability of any Metropolitan being “free of conflicts of 
interest” if asked to investigate other bishops, past or present, of his own diocese or province. 
Even where no direct ties exist, there will frequently be other close ties between mutual 
subordinates or superiors, protégés or mentors. And this is quite apart from other proprietary 
concerns that a Metropolitan might have about the moral, financial, and reputational 
liabilities of his own diocese and its personnel. Even apart from the kinds of Ordinary-
subordinate ties which we have particularly privileged in this paper, given other kinds of ties 
between US bishops, one wonders how any senior bishop can ever be, and/or be seen to be, 
truly “free of conflicts of interest” when investigating “brother bishops”. Indeed, this much is 
clear from the very first “Metropolitan model” investigation carried out in the US (before the 
model was enshrined in canon law): the above-discussed investigation of Bransfield by 
William Lori, Archbishop of Baltimore. As it turned out, Lori was himself one of the high-
ranking prelates who received cash gifts from Bransfield: $7500 in total, including $5000 to 
mark his becoming Bransfield’s Metropolitan. The original publication of Lori’s report 
redacted the names of those who had received Bransfield’s gifts, including – of course – 
Lori’s own (Ferrone, 2019; Pogorelc, forthcoming). Furthermore, our own network data show 
that while Lori and Bransfield are not closely tied, Lori served, if briefly, as an auxiliary of 
McCarrick’s in Washington. McCarrick too received cash from Bransfield. In what other area 
31 
 
of life would oneself and one’s close associates having received thousands of dollars in 
“gifts” from the person whose case one is investigating not obviously and automatically be a 
recusable “conflict of interest”? 
 
Conclusion 
 During this period of intense (deserved) scrutiny of various aspects of church 
governance and culture from many quarters, it has been common for commentators to think 
instinctively in relational terms. Even when focus of attention has been on specific, named 
individuals, discussion has often looked beyond personal misdeeds and culpability to also 
consider the extent to which individuals are enmeshed within, and thus both influence and 
influenced by, wider relationships and networks – and, therefore, also to the cultures, 
practices, and norms which they co-produce and co-maintain. Various examples of this from 
the reporting of the McCarrick case have been given above. Here let us add the earlier and 
more general observation of two Catholic legal scholars: “Bishops in the United States are 
part of a particular ecclesiastical culture that has its own influences, attitudes, and beliefs. 
This culture significantly influenced their decisions regarding clergy sexual abuse” (O’Reilly 
and Chalmers, 2014: 215). If this is so – and we firmly believe that it is – then tools which 
might help scholars, church officials, or indeed criminal investigators better understand the 
“social architecture” undergirding this culture are surely worth serious consideration. 
 In fact, our basic contention goes much deeper than this. An understanding of 
Catholic episcopal governance structures as “network[s] of social relations and interactions 
between actors” (Crossley 2011: 1) is not just a critical lens with which to investigate church 
scandals. Rather, social networks are integral to how such “ecclesiastical capital” (pace 
Bourdieu) is organized and maintained at all times, whether functioning well or not. Saintly 
and heroic bishops are, that is, just as much a “product” of networks as are defrocked former 
bishops. True, cases of abuse and cover-up serve as particularly apposite case-studies – both 
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due to their clear and present “public interest” nature (i.e., in exploring how they have arisen, 
and how future ones might be prevented), and to the level of investigative journalism that has 
gone into uncovering the full details (on which we have drawn, gratefully and liberally, in 
offering our own interpretations). But they remain case studies supporting our much more 
wide-ranging claim. That is, the significance of SNA as one valuable, and hitherto untried, 
tool for understanding and/or improving Church governance. (As we hope is implicit in every 
paragraph of this paper, we do not think that SNA alone – uninformed by the insights of other 
forms of theological or social-scientific inquiry – is a kind of methodological “silver bullet” 
for this subject, or indeed any others.) 
 Given all this, we wish to conclude by suggesting six specific areas where we think a 
relational, network-informed approach has the potential to yield interesting fruit, several of 
which we are already working on/towards.  
1. While we have privileged the Ordinary-subordinate tie here, there are of course 
others which may also be significant (Pogorelc, forthcoming). Among those that 
are, at least in theory, quantifiable, are: (co-)consecrators at episcopal ordinations; 
which seminaries/universities and years studied at; service together on certain 
committees or Boards of Directors. The degree to which these types of network 
overlap or correlate with each other would be a very interesting topic for enquiry. 
2. Extending Ordinary-subordinate (or other types of) ties backwards through time. 
To what extent are “kingmakers” among the previous generations of bishops still 
significant over current episcopal politics? Is it useful to think in terms of 
episcopal “family trees”, or even dynasties? Does the influence of different 
bishops or dioceses wax and wane over time (perhaps with changes in the pope or 
nuncio)? 
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3. Given the specific policies made by some bishops’ conferences (USCCB 
included) for affirmative action in promoting ethnic or linguistic minority 
candidates, for example in the form of national lists, to what extent do these 
policies actually work? 
4. Thinking practically and positively, if episcopal networks currently do exhibit 
tendencies towards certain “network pathologies”, how might these same methods 
aid in reforming them? Would a policy of appointing “qualified outsiders” (i.e., 
suitable bishops not already tied into regional clusters) to major dioceses help in 
mitigating the kinds of conflicts of interest suggested above, especially in helping 
to “clean up” scandal hit dioceses? (Based solely on our Ordinary-subordinate 
dataset, the appointment of Archbishop Wilton Gregory to Washington as Wuerl’s 
successor looks to be a promising example of precisely this.)  
5. Moving beyond national episcopal politics, what might be gained from applying 
SNA methods to studying the Roman curia (itself a major object of scrutiny under 
the current pontificate). Which are really the powerful dicasteries? Which bishops, 
from which countries, sit on which especially influential Congregations 
(especially. the Congregation for Bishops)? 
6. What light could SNA shed on certain historically important moments of 
episcopal politicking (cf. Wilde 2007; Pentin 2015; and O’Connell 2019 
respectively)? 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 I.e., (arch)bishops who are the head of a diocese or – in a small number of cases – who hold similar 
jurisdiction over a special grouping of Catholic clergy and laity outside of the normal Latin-rite diocesan 
structure. Examples of the latter include the “Personal Ordinariate of the Chair of St Peter”, a special pastoral 
structure for certain ex-Protestant clergy and laity whose Ordinary is a bishop (though the Ordinaries of parallel 
Ordinariates in the UK and Australia are not: see note 4), and the various “Eparchies” of the Eastern Catholic 
Churches – that is, the jurisdictions of various autonomous Churches in communion with Rome, such as the 
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church or the Syro-Malabar Catholic Church.  
2 Pogorelc’s insightful chapter, a late-stage draft of which we gratefully received as we were putting the 
finishing touches to this paper, makes a parallel case to our own for the potential benefits of an SNA-informed 
approach to episcopal culture and governance, especially in light of the abuse crisis.  
3 In February 2019, the Vatican announced that, as the “conclusion of a penal process” in canon law, McCarrick 
had been found “guilty of […] solicitation in the Sacrament of Confession, and sins against the Sixth 
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Commandment with minors and with adults, with the aggravating factor of the abuse of power” (Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith, 2019). He was accordingly laicized. Full details were not, however, made public. 
In this paper we have relied for such details on the reports of mainstream media sources (all cited).  
4 There are exceptions to this rule in the case of, for example, already-married ex-clergy from other 
denominations who convert to Catholicism and are accepted for Catholic ordination. But these are relatively few 
in number, and are, in any case, debarred from becoming bishops – and so sit outside of the kinds of network 
dynamics we’re exploring here. 
5 ‘Equivalents’ here refers to other formal structures, existing in parallel to the territorial diocesan system, which 
possess their own Ordinary (whether a bishop or not). In England and Wales, these are the Bishopric of the 
Forces, two Eparchies of Eastern Catholic Churches (Syro-Malabar and Ukrainian), the Personal Ordinariate of 
Our Lady of Walsingham, and an Apostolic Prefecture responsible for the British Overseas Territories of the 
South Atlantic. Although not all of these are ordained as bishops, they are deemed “equivalent in [canon] law to 
a diocesan bishop” (Code of Canon Law, 381 §2). For ease of style and interpretation, in this paper all such 
“equivalents” will simply be included in the generic term “bishops”, unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
6 Coadjutor status (roughly speaking, an auxiliary with right of episcopal succession) was originally coded 
separately as a “4”. However, it was soon decided that this needlessly complicated matters (especially given the 
relative rarity of coadjutor appointments), and all 4s were recoded to 3s before analysis. 
7 Though beyond the scope of this paper, we are also exploring networked relationships within the Curia, using 
similar methods. 
8 “Historical” in the sense of relating to events that occurred often several years or decades ago. Their effects 
and implications are often, of course, very current.  
9 There are exceptions here, for example with central lists of suitable ethnic-minority candidates or the 
occasional cross-country posting of a priest with a national profile (as with Barron’s appointment as auxiliary 
bishop of Los Angeles, from being a seminary Rector in Chicago), but these are just that: exceptions. 
